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Abstract: Let {S′Ni | i ∈ IN} represent a set of consequence opera-
tors defined on a language Λ, where each member of {S′Ni | i ∈ IN}
corresponds to a science-community physical theory and each Ni is a
S′Nj -system for each j ∈ IN. It is shown that there exists a hyperfinite
ultralogic U ∈ ∗Cf defined on all internal subsets of ∗Λ such that
U 6= ∗U, and, for each i, j ∈ IN, ∗S′
Ni
( ∗Nj) = U( ∗Nj). For each
internal Y ⊂ ∗Λ,
⋃
{ ∗S′
Ni
(Y ) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(Y ) ⊂ ∗Λ. Further, if
finite X ⊂ Λ, then
⋃
{ ∗S′
Ni
(X) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X), and if each member
of {S′Ni | i ∈ IN} is a practical consequence operator, then
⋃
{S′
Ni
(X) |
i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X), and, for each i, j ∈ IN, S′
Ni
(Nj) = U(Nj). Standard
unifications for physical theories are also given.
1. Introduction.
In Herrmann (2001a, b), a restricted hyperfinite ultralogic unification is con-
structed. The restrictions placed upon this construction were necessary in order to
relate the constructed ultralogic directly to the types of ultralogics used to model
probability models (Herrmann 2001c, d). In particular, the standard collections of
consequence operators are restricted to a very special set of operators HX, where
X is itself restricted to the set of all significant members of a language Λ. In this
paper, all such restrictions are removed. For reader convince, some of the intro-
ductory remarks that appear in Herrmann (2001a, b) are repeated. Over seventy
years ago, Tarski (1956, pp. 60-109) introduced consequence operators as models
for various aspects of human thought. There are two such mathematical theories
investigated, the general and the finitary consequence operators (Herrmann, 1987).
Let L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator and F the finite power
set operator. There are three cardinality independent axioms.
Definition 1.1. A mapping C:P(L)→ P(L) is a general consequence operator
(or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L)
(1) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if
(2) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
*Any typographical errors that appear in the published version of this paper are
caused by faulty publisher editing.
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A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finitary (finite) if it satisfies
(3) C(X) =
⋃
{C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}.
Remark 1.2. The above axioms (1), (2), (3) are not independent. Indeed, (1)
and (3) imply (2). Clearly, the set of all finitary consequence operators defined on a
specific language is a subset of the set of all general operators. The phrase “defined
on L” means formally defined on P(L).
All known scientific logic-systems use finitely many rules of inference and
finitely many steps in the construction of a deduction from these rules. Hence,
as shown in Herrmann (2001a, b), the consequence operator that models such the-
ory generating thought processes is a finitary consequence operator. Although many
of the results in this paper hold for the general consequence operator, we are only
interested in collections of finitary consequence operators. Dziobiak (1981, p. 180)
states the Theorem 2.10 below. However, the statement is made without a formal
proof and is relative to a special propositional language. Theorem 2.10 is obtained
by using only basic set-theoretic notions and Tarski’s basic results for any language.
Further, the proof reveals some interesting facts not previously known. Unless
noted, all utilized Tarski (1956, pp. 60-91) results are cardinality independent.
2. The Lattice of Finitary Operators.
Definition 2.1. In all that follows, any set of consequence operators will be
nonempty and each is defined on a nonempty language. Define the relation ≤ on
the set C of all general consequence operators defined on L by stipulating that for
any C1,C2 ∈ C, C1 ≤ C2 if for every X ∈ P(L), C1(X) ⊂ C2(X).
Obviously, ≤ is a partial order contained in C × C. Our standard result will show
that for the entire set of finitary consequence operators Cf ⊂ C defined on L, the
structure 〈Cf ,≤〉 is a lattice.
Definition 2.2. Define I:P(L) → P(L) and U:P(L) → P(L) as follows: for
each X ⊂ L, let I(X) = X, and let U(X) = L.
Notice that I is the lower unit (the least element) and U the upper unit (the greatest
element) for 〈Cf ,≤〉 and 〈C,≤〉.
Definition 2.3. Let C ∈ C. A set X ⊂ L is a C-system or simply a system
if C(X) ⊂ X and, hence, if C(X) = X. For each C ∈ C, let S(C) = {X | (X ⊂
L) ∧ (C(X) = X)}.
Since C(L) = L for each C ∈ C, then each S(C) 6= ∅.
Lemma 2.4 For each C1, C2 ∈ C, C1 ≤ C2 if and only if S(C2) ⊂ S(C1).
Proof. Let any C1, C2 ∈ C and C1 ≤ C2. Consider any Y ∈ S(C2). Then
C1(Y) ⊂ C2(Y) = Y. Thus, C1 ∈ S(C1) implies that S(C2) ⊂ S(C1).
Conversely, suppose that S(C2) ⊂ S(C1). Let X ⊂ L. Then since, by axiom
1, C2(X) ∈ S(C2), it follows, from the requirement that C2(X) ∈ S(C1), that
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C1(C2(X)) = C2(X). But X ⊂ C2(X) implies that C1(X) ⊂ C1(C2(X)) = C2(X),
from axiom 2. Hence, C1 ≤ C2 and the proof is complete.
Definition 2.5. For each C1, C2 ∈ C, define the following binary relations in
P(L)×P(L). For each X ⊂ L, let (C1 ∧C2)(X) = C1(X)∩C2(X) and (C1 ∨wC2) =⋂
{Y ⊂ L | (X ⊂ Y = C1(Y) = C2(Y))} For finitely many members of C, the
operators ∧, ∨w are obviously commutative and associative. These two relations are
extended to arbitrary A ⊂ C by defining (
∧
A)(X) =
∧
A(X) =
⋂
{C(X) | C ∈ A}
and (
∨
wA)(X) =
∨
wA(X) =
⋂
{Y ⊂ L | X ⊂ Y = C(Y) for all C ∈ A} (Dziobiak,
1981, p. 178). Notice that
∨
wA(X) =
⋂
{Y ⊂ L | (X ⊂ Y) ∧ (Y ∈
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈
A})}.
Lemma 2.6. Let A ⊂ C [resp. Cf ] and S′ = {X | (X ⊂ L) ∧ (X =
∨
wA(X))}.
Then S′ =
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ A}.
Proof. By Tarski’s Theorem 11 (b) (1956, p. 71), which holds for finitary
and general consequence operators, for each X ⊂ L and C ∈ A, X ⊂
∨
wA(X) =
Y′ ∈ S(C). Hence, if Y′ ∈ S′, then
∨
wA(Y
′) = Y′ ∈ S(C) for each C ∈ A. Thus
S′ ⊂
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ A}. Conversely, let Y ∈
⋂
{S(C) | (C ∈ A)}. From the definition
of
∨
w,
∨
wA(Y) = Y and, hence, Y ∈ S
′ and this completes the proof.
Lemma 2.7. Let nonempty B ⊂ P(L) and L ∈ B. Then the operator CB
defined for each X ⊂ L by CB(X) =
⋂
{Y | X ⊂ Y ∈ B} is a general consequence
operator defined on L.
Proof. Assuming the hypothesis, it is obvious that CB:P(L)→ P(L) and X ⊂
CB(X). Clearly, if Z ⊂ X ⊂ L, then CB(Z) ⊂ CB(X); and, for each Y ∈ B, X ⊂ Y
if and only if CB(X) ⊂ Y. Hence, CB(CB(X)) =
⋂
{Y | CB(X) ⊂ Y ∈ B} = CB(X).
This completes the proof.
Remark 2.8. The hypotheses of Lemma 2.7 do not require that the set B be
closed under arbitrary intersection.
Theorem 2.9. With respect to the partial order relation ≤ defined on L, the
structure 〈C,∨w,∧, I,U〉 is a complete lattice with upper and lower units.
Proof. Let A ⊂ C and B =
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ A}. Since L ∈ B, then by Lemma 2.7,∨
wA = CB ∈ C. Moreover, by Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6, CB is the least upper bound
for A with respect to ≤ .
Next, let B =
⋃
{S(C) | C ∈ A}. For X ⊂ L, X ⊂ C(X) for each C ∈ A. For
each C ∈ A, there does not exist a YC such that YC ∈ S(C), X 6= YC,YC 6= C(X)
and X ⊂ YC ⊂ C(X). Hence, CB(X) =
⋂
{Y | X ⊂ Y ∈ B} =
⋂
{C(X) | C ∈ A} =∧
A(X). Hence,
∧
A ∈ C and it is obvious that
∧
A is the greatest lower bound for
A with respect to ≤ . This completes the proof.
Although the proof appears in error, (Wo´jcicki, 1970) stated Theorem 2.9 for
a propositional language. In what follows, we only investigate the basic lattice
structure for 〈Cf ,≤〉.
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Theorem 2.10. With respect to the partial order relation ≤ defined on Cf , the
structure 〈Cf ,∨w,∧, I, U〉 is a lattice with upper and lower units.
Proof. It is only necessary to consider two distinct C1, C2 ∈ Cf . As mentioned,
the commutative and associative laws hold for ∧ and ∨w and by definition each
maps P(L) into P(L). In 〈C,≤〉, using theorem 2.9, axiom 1 and 2 hold for the
greatest lower bound C1 ∧ C2 and for the least upper bound C1 ∨w C2. Next, we
have that (C1 ∧ C2)(X) = (
⋃
{C1(Y) | Y ∈ F(X)}) ∩ (
⋃
{C2(Y) | Y ∈ F(X)}) =⋃
{C1(Y) ∩ C2(Y) | Y ∈ F(X)} =
⋃
{(C1 ∧ C2)(Y) | Y ∈ F(X)} and axiom 3 holds
and, hence, C1∧C2 ∈ Cf . Therefore, 〈Cf ,∧, I,U〉 is, at the least, a meet semi-lattice.
Next, we show by direct means that for each C1, C2 ∈ Cf , C1 ∨w C2 ∈ Cf . Let
(the cardinality of L) |L| = ∆. For each Xi ⊂ L, (i ∈ ∆), let A′(Xi) = {Y | (Xi ⊂
Y ∈ S(C1)∩S(C2))∧ (Y ⊂ L)}. Let
⋂
{Y | Y ∈ A′(Xi)} = Yi. By Tarski’s Theorem
11a (1956, p. 71) Xi ⊂ Yi ∈ S(C1)∩S(C2), and by definition Yi = (C1 ∨w C2)(Xi).
Hence, Yi ∈ A′(Xi) and is the least (⊂) element. For Xi ⊂ L, let A′′(Xi) =
{Y | (C1(Xi) ⊂ Y ∈ S(C1) ∩ S(C2)) ∧ (Y ⊂ L)}. Since Xi ⊂ Ck(Xi), k = 1, 2,
then A′′ ⊂ A′. Since L ∈ A′(Xi), A′(Xi) 6= ∅. Indeed, let Y ∈ A′(Xi). Then
Xi ⊂ Ck(Y) = Y, k = 1, 2. Additionally, Xi ⊂ C1(Y) = Y implies that Xi ⊂
C1(Xi) = C1(C1(Xi)) ⊂ C1(C1(Y)) = C1(Y) = Y. Hence, it follows that for any
Xi ⊂ L, A
′′(Xi) = A
′(Xi). For fixed Xi ⊂ L, let Xj ∈ F(Xi). Let Yj be defined as
above and, hence, Yj is the least element in A′(Xj) = A′′(Xj). Consider D = {Yj |
Xj ∈ F(Xi)}, and, for j = 1, . . . , n, consider Yj ∈ D and the corresponding Xj ⊂ L.
Let Xk =
⋃
{Xj | j = 1, . . . , n} ∈ F(Xi). Then Yk =
⋂
{Y | Y ∈ A′(Xk)} ∈ D. If
Y ∈ A′(Xk), then Y ∈ A′(Xj), j = 1, . . . , n. Hence, Yj ⊂ Yk, j = 1, . . . , n implies
that Y1∪· · ·∪Yn ⊂ Yk. Tarski’s Theorem 12 (1956, p. 71) implies that Y∗ =
⋃
{Yj |
Xj ∈ F(Xi)} ∈ S(C1) ∩ S(C2). Also, by definition, for all Xj ⊂ L, Yj ∈ A′′(Xj)
implies that C1(Xj) ⊂ Yj. The fact that C1 is finitary yields C1(Xi) ⊂ Y∗. Hence,
Y∗ ∈ A′′(Xi). Since C1(Xj) ⊂ C1(Xi), Xj ∈ F(Xi), then A′′(Xi) ⊂ A′′(Xj). Thus
Yj ⊂ Yi, Xj ∈ F(Xi). Therefore, Y
∗ ⊂ Yi. But, Y
∗ ∈ A′′(Xi) implies that Y
∗ = Yi.
Re-stating this last result,
⋃
{(C1 ∨w C2)(Xj) | Xj ∈ F(Xi)} = (C1 ∨w C2)(Xi) and,
therefore, axiom (3) holds for the binary relation ∨w and 〈Cf ,∨w,∧, I,U〉 is a lattice.
This completes the proof.
Corollary 2.10.1. For the set Cf of all finitary consequence operators defined
on L, the structure 〈Cf ,∧,∨w, I,U〉 is a join-complete lattice.
Proof. Let non-empty A ⊂ Cf . Now simply modify the second part of the proof
of Theorem 2.10 by substituting
⋂
{S(C) | C ∈ A} for S(C1) ∩ S(C2) and letting
C1 ∈ A. This complete the proof.
Remark 2.11. Tarshi’s Theorem 12 requires finitary consequence operators.
It is known, since I is a lower bound for any A ⊂ Cf that 〈Cf ,∨w, I,U〉 is actually a
complete lattice with a meet operator generated by the
∨
w-operator. It appears that
this meet operator need not correspond, in general, to results for the defined
∧
A
operator for an infinite A. Wo´jcicki (1973) has constructed, for a set of consequnece
operators C′, an infinite A ⊂ C′ of finitary consequence operators, with some very
special properties. However, the general consequence operator defined for each X ⊂
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L by
⋂
{C(X) | C ∈ A} is not a finitary operator. Thus, in general, 〈Cf ,∨w,∧, I,U〉
need not be a complete sublattice of 〈C,∨w,∧, I,U〉. This behavior is not unusual.
For example, let infinite X have an infinite topology T . Then 〈T ,∪, ∅, X〉 is a join-
complete subsemi-lattice of the complete lattice 〈P(X),∪,∩, ∅, X〉. The structure
〈T ,∪, ∅, X〉is actually complete, but it is not a sublattice of 〈P(X),∪,∩, ∅, X〉.
3. System Consistent Logic-systems
Let Σ be a non-empty set of science-community logic-systems and let | · | denote
cardinality. In practice, |Σ| ≤ ℵ0. Each logic-system Si ∈ Σ, i ∈ |Σ|, is defined on
a countable language Li and each Si determines a specific finitary consequence
operator Ci defined on a language Li. At the least, by application of the insertion
of hypotheses rule (Herrmann, 2001a/b, p. 94/2), for nonempty cardinal ∆ ≤ |Σ|,
each member of {Ci | i ∈ ∆} is defined on the language
⋃
{Li | i ∈ ∆}. In all that
follows, a specific set of logic-system generated consequence operators {Ci | i ∈ ∆}
defined on a specific set of languages {Li | i ∈ ∆} will always be considered as
trivially extended and, hence, defined by the insertion of hypotheses rule on the set⋃
{Li | i ∈ ∆}. In general, such a specific set of consequence operators is contained
in the lattice of all finitary operators defined on
⋃
{Li | i ∈ ∆}. A logic-system S′
and its corresponding consequence operator is a trivial extension of a logic-system’s
S defined on L where, for a language L′ ⊃ L, S′ is the same as S except that only the
hypotheses insertion rule now applies to L′−L. The system S′ and its corresponding
consequence operator C′ is a non-trivial extension if it is extended to L′ by insertion
and some other n-ary relations that contain members of L′−L are adjoined to those
in S or various original n-ary relations in S are extended by adding n-tuples that
contain members from L′ − L. For both the trivial and non-trivial cases and with
respect to the language L′, it follows that C ≤ C′. In the trivial case, if X ⊂ L′,
then C′(X) = C(X ∩ L) ∪ (X− L).
In practice, a practical logic-system is a logic-system defined for the subsets of
a finite language Lf . When a specific deduction is made from a set of hypotheses X,
the set X is finite. If the logic-system also includes 1-ary sets, such as the logical or
physical axioms, the actual set of axioms that might be used for a deduction is also
finite. Indeed, the actual set of all deductions obtained at any moment in human
history and used by a science-community form a finite set of statements that are
contained in a finite language Lf . (Finite languages, the associated consequence
operators and the like will usually be denoted by a f superscript.) The finitely
many n-ary relations that model the rules of inference for a practical logic-system
are finite sets. Practical logic-systems generate practical consequence operators and
practical consequence operators generate effectively practical logic-systems, in many
ways. For example, the method found in  Los´, J. and R. Suszko (1958), when ap-
plied to a Cf , will generate effectively a finite set of rules of inference. The practical
logic-system obtained from such rules generates the original practical consequence
operator. Hence, a consequence operator Cf defined on Lf is considered a practi-
cal consequence operator although it may not correspond to a previously defined
scientific practical logic-system; nevertheless, it does correspond to an equivalent
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practical logic-system.
Our definition of a physical theory is a refinement of the usual definition. Given
a set of physical hypotheses, general scientific statements are deduced. If accepted
by a science-community, these statements become natural laws. These natural laws
then become part of a science-community’s logic-system. In Herrmann (2001a, b,
a), a consequence operator generated by such a logic-system is denoted by SN. From
collections of such logic-systems, the SN they generate are then applied to specific
natural-system descriptions X. For scientific practical logic-systems, the language
and rules of inference need not be completely determinate in that, in practice, the
language and rules of inference are extended.
The complete Tarski definition for a consequence operator includes finite lan-
guages (1956, p. 63) and all of the Tarski results used in this paper apply to such
finite languages. Theorem 2.10 holds for any language finite or not. In the lattice of
finitary consequence operators defined on Lf , ∨w determines the least upper bound
for a finite set of such operators. However, it is certainly possible that this least
upper bound is the upper unit U.
Definition 3.1. Let C be a general consequence operator defined in L. Let
X ⊂ L.
(i) The set X is C-consistent if C(X) 6= L.
(ii) The set X is C-complete if for each x ∈ L, either x ∈ X or C(X ∪ {x}) = L.
(iii) A set X ⊂ L is maximally C-consistent if X is C-consistent and whenever
a set Y 6= X and X ⊂ Y ⊂ L, then C(Y) = L.
Notice that if X ⊂ L is C-consistent, then C(X) is a C-consistent extension of X
which is also a C-system. Further, C-consistent W is C-consistent with respect to
any trivial extension of C to a language L′ ⊃ L.
Theorem 3.2 Let general consequence operator C be defined on L.
(i) The set X ⊂ L is C-complete and C-consistent if and only if X is a maximally
C-consistent.
(ii) If X is maximally C-consistent, then X is a C-system.
Proof. (i) Let X be maximally C-consistent. Then X is C-consistent and, hence,
C(X) 6= L. Hence, let x ∈ L and x /∈ X. Then X ⊂ X∪{x} implies that X∪{x} is not
C-consistent. Thus C(X ∪ {x}) = L. Hence, X is C-complete. Conversely, assume
that X is C-consistent and C-complete. Then X 6= L. Let X ⊂ Y ⊂ L and X 6= Y.
Hence, there is some y ∈ Y −X and from C-completeness L = C(X ∪ {y}) ⊂ C(Y).
Thus, Y is not C-consistent. Hence, X is maximally C-consistent and the result
follows.
(ii) From C-consistency, C(X) 6= L. If x ∈ C(X) − X, then maximally C-
consistent implies that L = C(X ∪ {x}) ⊂ C(C(X)) = C(X). This contradiction
yields that X is a C-system.
The following easily obtained result holds for many types of languages (Tarski,
1956, p. 98. Mendelson, 1979, p. 66) but these “Lindenbaum” constructions,
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for infinite languages, are not considered as effective. For finite languages, such
constructions are obviously effective.
Theorem 3.3. Let practical consequence operator Cf be defined on arbitrary
Lf . If X ⊂ Lf is Cf -consistent, then there exists an effectively constructed Y ⊂ Lf
such that Cf(X) ⊂ Y, Y is Cf-consistent and Cf -complete.
Proof. This is rather trivial for a practical consequence operator and all of
the construction processes are effective. Consider an enumeration for Lf such that
Lf = {x1, x2, . . .xk}. Let X ⊂ Lf be Cf -consistent and define X = X0. We now
simply construct in a completely effective manner a partial sequence of subsets of
Lf . Simply consider X0 ∪ {x1}. Since X0 is C
f -consistent, we have two possibilities.
Effectively determine whether Cf(X0 ∪ {x1}) = Lf . If so, let X1 = X0. On the other
hand, if Cf(X0 ∪ {x1}) 6= Lf , then define X1 = X0 ∪ {x1}. Repeat this construction
finitely many times. (Usually, if the language is denumerable, this is expressed in
an induction format.) Let Y = Xk. By definition, Y is C
f -consistent. Suppose that
x ∈ Lf . Then there is some Xi such that either (a) x ∈ Xi or (b) Cf(Xi ∪ {x}) = Lf .
For (a), since Xi ⊂ Y, x ∈ Y. For (b), Xi ⊂ Y, implies that L = Cf(Xi ∪ {x}) ⊂
Cf(Y ∪ {x}) = Lf . Hence, Y is Cf -complete and Xi ⊂ Y, for each i = 1, . . . , k. By
Theorem 3.2, Y is a Cf -system. Thus X0 ⊂ Y implies that Cf(X0) ⊂ Cf(Y) = Y,
and this completes the proof.
Corollary 3.3.1. Let practical consequence operator Cf be defined on Lf and
X ⊂ Lf be Cf-consistent. Then there exists an effectively constructed Y ⊂ Lf that is
an extension of Cf(X) and, hence, also an extension of X, where Y is a maximally
Cf-consistent Cf-system.
Let the set Σp ⊂ Σ consist of all of science-community practical logic-systems
defined on languages Lfi . Each member of Σ
p corresponds to i ∈ |Σp| and to a
practical consequence operator Cfi defined on L
f
i . In general, the members of a set
of science-community logic-systems are related by a consistency notion relative to
an extended language.
Definition 3.4. A set of consequence operators C defined on L is system
consistent if there exists a Y ⊂ L, Y 6= L and Y is a C-system for each C ∈ C.
Example 3.5. Let C be a set of axiomless consequence operators where
each C ∈ C is define on L. In Herrmann (2001a, b), the set of science-community
consequence operators is redefined by relativization to produce a set of axiomless
consequence operators, the SVN, each defined on the same language. Any such col-
lection C is system consistent since for each C ∈ C, C(∅) = ∅ 6= L.
Example 3.6. One of the major goals of certain science-communities is to
find what is called a “grand unification theory.” This is actually a theory that will
unify only the four fundamental interactions (forces). It is then claimed that this
will somehow lead to a unification of all physical theories. Undoubtedly, if this
type of grand unification is achieved, all other physical science theories will require
some type of re-structuring. The simplest way this can be done is to use informally
7
the logic-system expansion technique. This will lead to associated consequence
operators defined on “larger” language sets.
Let a practical logic-system S0, be defined on L
f
0, and L =
⋃
{Lfi | i ∈ IN}, IN
the set of natural numbers. Let L0 ⊂ L1,L0 6= L1. [Note: the remaining members of
{Lfi | i ∈ IN} need not be distinct.] Expand S0 to S1 6= S0 defined on L by adjoining
to the logic-system S0 finitely many practical logic-system n-ary relations or finitely
many additional n-tuples to the original S0, but where all of these additions only
contain members from nonempty L − Lf0. Although S1 need only be considered as
non-trivially defined on Lf1, if L 6= L1, then the S1 so obtained corresponds to C1, a
consequence operator trivially extended to L. This process can be repeated in order
to produce, at the least, finitely many distinct logic-systems Si, i > 1, that extend
S0 and a set C1 of distinct corresponding consequence operators Ci. Since these
are science-community logic-systems, there is an X0 ⊂ Lf0 that is C
f
0-consistent. By
Corollary 3.3.1, there is an effectively defined set Y ⊂ Lf0 such that X0 ⊂ Y and Y is
maximally Cf0-consistent with respect to the language L
f
0. Hence, C
f
0(Y) = Y ⊂ L
f
0
and Cf0(Y) 6= L
f
0. Further, C
f
0 is consider trivially extended to L. Let Y
′ = Y ∪ (L−
Lf0). It follows that for each Ci, L−L
f
0 ⊂ Ci(L−L
f
0) ⊂ L−L
f
0 6= L. By construction,
for each Ci, Ci(Y) = Y; and for each X ⊂ L, Ci(X) = C0(X∩Lf0)∪Ci(X∩(L−L
f
0)).
So, let X = Y′. Then for each Ci, Ci(Y
′) = C0(Y)∪(L−Lf0) = Y∪(L−L
f
0) = Y
′ 6= L.
Hence, the set of all Ci is system consistent.
Example 3.7. Consider a denumerable language L and Example 3.2 in Her-
rmann (1987). [Note: There is a typographical error in this 1987 example. The
expression x /∈ U should read x /∈ U.] Let U be a free-ultrafilter on L and let x ∈ L.
Then there exists some U ∈ U such that x /∈ U since
⋂
U = ∅ and ∅ /∈ U . Let
B = {x} and C = {P(U,B) | U ∈ U}, where P(U,B) is the finitary consequence
operator defined by P(U,B)(X) = U ∪ X, if x ∈ X; and P(U,B)(X) = X, if x /∈ X.
[Note: this is the same operator P that appears in the proof of Theorem 6.4 in
Herrmann (2001a, b).] There, at the least, exists a sequence S = {Ui | i ∈ IN} such
that U0 = U and Ui+1 ⊂ Ui, Ui+1 6= Ui. It follows immediately from the defini-
tion that P(Ui+1,B) ≤ P(Ui,B) and P(Ui+1,B)(B) = Ui+1 ∪ B ⊂ Ui ∪ B, for each
i ∈ IN. Hence, in general, P(Ui+1,B) < P(Ui,B) for each i ∈ IN. Let Y = L − {x}.
Then P(Ui,B)(Y) = Ui ∪ (L − {x}) = L − {x} = Y, i ∈ IN. Thus, the collection
{P(Ui,B) | i ∈ IN} is system consistent.
Theorem 3.8. Consider A ⊂ Cf defined on L and the (≤) least upper bound∨
wA. Then
∨
wA ∈ Cf and if A is system consistent, then there exists some Y ⊂ L
such that Y =
∨
wA(Y) = C(Y) 6= L for each C ∈ A and
∨
wA 6= U. Further, if
X ⊂ L,X 6= L, is a C-system for each C ∈ A, then X =
∨
wA(X) = C(X) 6= L for
each C ∈ A.
Proof. Corollary 2.10.1 yields the first conclusion. From the definition of system
consistent, there exists some Y ⊂ L such that C(Y) = Y 6= L for each C ∈ A. From
Lemma 2.6, for each C ∈ A,
∨
wA(Y) = C(Y) 6= L. Hence,
∨
wA 6= U. The last part
of this theorem follows from Lemma 2.6 and the fact that X is also a
∨
wA-system.
This completes the proof.
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4. An Ultralogic Unification
Assume for nonempty Σ, that |Σ| ≤ ℵ0. Let C denote a set of (logic-system)
corresponding finitary consequence operators each considered as defined on the lan-
guage L. There exists a surjection f: IN → C such that f(i) is one of the members
of C and for each C ∈ C there is some j ∈ IN such that f(j) = C. For each i ∈ IN,
let f(i) = Ci denote a consequence operator defined on L. As usual, for the next
theorem, we use the boldface type convention (Herrmann, 1993, p. 21), and for the
case C, C, will denote boldface type.
Theorem 4.1. Let L and {Ci | i ∈ IN} = C be defined as above. Suppose that
every (non-empty) finite subset of C is system consistent.
(i) Then there exists a hyperfinite ultralogic U ∈ ∗Cf defined on the set of
all internal subsets of ∗L such that U 6= ∗U, and an internal W ⊂ ∗L such that,
for each Ci ∈ C, ∗Ci(W ) = U(W ) =W 6= ∗L, where U(W ) ⊂ ∗L.
(ii) For each internal Y ⊂ ∗L,
⋃
{ ∗Ci(Y ) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(Y ) ⊂ ∗L.
(iii) If finite X ⊂ L, then
⋃
{ ∗Ci(X) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X), and if each member
of C is a practical consequence operator, then
⋃
{Ci(X) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X).
(iv) Let X ⊂ L and X 6= L be a C-system for each C ∈ C. Then ∗X =
∗Ci(
∗X) = U( ∗X) 6= ∗L, for each i ∈ IN. If X is finite X = ∗Ci(X) = U(X), for
each i ∈ IN. If for j ∈ IN, Cj is a practical consequence operator, then X = Cj(X) =
U(X) = U(X).
Proof. Let 〈Cf ,∨w,∧, I,U〉 be the lattice of all finitary consequence opera-
tors defined on L. Consider this lattice, all of our intuitive consequence operators,
our L and all other defined objects as embedded into the Grundlagen Structure Y
(Herrmann, 1993). Hence, they are embedded, in the usual manner, into the su-
perstructure model, M = 〈N ,∈,=〉, for all bounded formal expressions and this is
further embedded into the superstructure Y that contains a nonstandard elementary
extension ∗M = 〈 ∗N ,∈,=〉 of the embedded M. Notice that from our identifica-
tions, any standard X ⊂ L has the property that σX = X, and if X is finite, then
∗X = X. Under our basic embedding, let g: IN→ C be a surjection in N that corre-
sponds to f. Now consider the surjection ∗g: ∗IN→ ∗C. Let constant a ∈ IN. Under
our special Grundlagen embedding procedures, ∗(g(a)) = ∗g( ∗a) = ∗g(a) = ∗Ca.
Since ∗g is a surjection, an a ∈ IN corresponds to a member of σC and conversely.
Thus, ∗g restricted to members of σIN = IN yields the entire set σC.
Let nonempty K ⊂ P(L) be the set of all X 6= L that if X ∈ K, then X is a
C-system for each C ∈ C. By Theorem 3.8, the definitions and the properties of
the lattice structure on Cf , for clarity, the unsimplified and redundantly expressed
bounded sentences
∀x((x 6= ∅) ∧ (x ∈ F(IN))→ ∃y∃w1((y ∈ Cf ) ∧ (y 6= U) ∧ (w1 ∈ P(L))∧
(∀z1∀v1∀v2((v1 ∈ x) ∧ (v2 ∈ K) ∧ (v1 ∈ IN) ∧ (z1 ∈ x) ∧ (z1 ∈ IN)→ (g(z1)(v2) =
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y(v2) = v2 ⊂ L) ∧ (y(v2) 6= L))) ∧ (∀v((v ∈ x) ∧ (v ∈ IN)→
g(v)(w1) = y(w1) = w1 6= L)) ∧ ∀z((z ∈ x) ∧ (z ∈ IN)→ ((g(z) ≤ y)∧
∀w((w ∈ Cf ) ∧ ∀z1((z1 ∈ x) ∧ (z1 ∈ IN) ∧ (g(z1) ≤ w))→ (y ≤ w)))))), (4.1.1)
∀x∀y((x ∈ Cf ) ∧ (y ∈ Cf )→ ((y ≤ x)↔
∀w((w ∈ P(L))→ (y(w) ⊂ x(w))))), (4.1.2)
hold in M. Hence, they hold under *-transfer in ∗M for objects in ∗N . [Note:
It is usually assumed that formal statements such as 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 can be made
within a formal first-order language rather than expressing them explicitly.]
The set ∗Cf is a collection of hyperfinite consequence operators defined on the
internal subsets of ∗L. Let infinite λ ∈ ∗IN − IN. Then ∗g[[0, λ]] is a hyperfinite
subset of ∗C ⊂ ∗Cf . Hence, from *-transformed sentences (4.1.1) and (4.1.2),
there exists some hyperfinite U ∈ ∗Cf defined on the set of all internal Y ⊂ ∗L
with the properties that ∗g(i)(Y ) ⊂ U(Y ), for each i ∈ [0, λ], and, in particular
for i ∈ IN. Hence,
⋃
{ ∗Ci(Y ) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(Y ). Further, there exists an internal
W ⊂ ∗L such that, for each i ∈ [0, λ], ∗g(i)(W ) = U(W ) =W 6= ∗L. In particular,
∗g(i)(W ) = ∗Ci(W ) = U(W ), for each i ∈ IN. Since U(W ) 6= ∗L, then U 6= ∗U.
Let finite X ⊂ L. Then due to our embedding procedures, ∗(Ci(X)) = ∗Ci( ∗X) =
∗Ci(X) ⊂ U(X) 6=
∗L. Hence,
⋃
{ ∗Ci(X) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X). [Note: in proofs such
as this and to avoided confusion, I often, at first, use the notation ∗(Ci(X)) to
indicate the value (or name) of the result of applying ∗ to an object in N which is
a set such as Ci(X) that contains additional operator notation. From a technical
viewpoint, ∗(Ci(X)) =
∗{Ci(X)} = { ∗Ci(X)} and ∗Ci(X) is the “name” for
the set under the mapping *. But using this procedure, there is confusion as to
whether ∗(Ci(X)) denotes the entire set or denotes the operator
∗Ci applied to
X. In these proofs, ∗Ci always denotes the operator
∗Ci applied to internal subsets
of ∗L.] If Ci is a practical consequence operator, then Ci(X) is a finite set. Hence
∗Ci(X) = Ci(X). (iv) follows by *-transfer and this completes the proof.
In Herrmann (2001a, b), the set {SVNj | j ∈ IN} is the refined set of all relativized
axiomless science-community consequence operators defined on a language Λ and
they are used to unify, in a restricted manner, physical theory behavior. Moreover,
for sequentially presented {SVNj | j ∈ IN}, 1 ≤ |{S
V
Nj
| j ∈ IN}| ≤ ℵ0.
Corollary 4.1.1.
(i) There exists a hyperfinite ultralogic U ∈ ∗Cf that is defined on all
internal Y ⊂ ∗Λ such that U 6= ∗U, and, for each i ∈ IN, ∗SV
Ni
(∅) = U(∅) = ∅.
(ii) For each internal Y ⊂ ∗Λ,
⋃
{ ∗SV
Ni
(Y ) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(Y ) ⊂ ∗Λ.
(iii) If finite X ⊂ Λ, then
⋃
{ ∗SV
Ni
(X) | i ∈ IN} ⊂ U(X), and if each
member of {SVNi | i ∈ IN} is a practical consequence operator, then
⋃
{SV
Ni
(X) | i ∈
IN} ⊂ U(X).
(iv) Let X ⊂ Λ, X 6= Λ be a C-system for each C ∈ {SVNi(X) | i ∈ IN}.
Then ∗X = ∗SV
Ni
( ∗X) = U( ∗X) 6= ∗Λ, for such each i ∈ IN. If X is finite, then
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∗SV
Ni
(X) = X = U(X), for each i ∈ IN. If for j ∈ IN, SVNj is a practical consequence
operator, then SV
Nj
(X) = X = U(X).
5. Further Applications
If the C in the hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 is restricted to a set of practical
consequence operators, each defined on a finite language Lf , then it follows that
the hyperfinite U corresponds to a hyperfinite logic-system S that is *-effectively
*-generated. If the effective notion is not required, then, in general, the ultralogic
U corresponds to a *-logic-system. Although Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1.1 are
mainly concerned with the original set of consequence operators C and {SVNi(X) | i ∈
IN}, when |{SVNi(X) | i ∈ IN}| = ℵ0, it is also significant for applications that U unifies
each “ultranatural relativized theory” ∗g(j), j ∈ [0, λ]− IN. It follows that for each
j ∈ [0, λ]− IN, ∗g(j)(∅) = U(∅) = ∅ and for internal Y ⊂ ∗Λ, ∗g(j)(Y ) ⊂ U(W ).
This also applies to the unrelativized case with the modifications that ∅ is replaced
withW and each relativized consequence operator SVNi is replaced with the physical
theory consequence operator SNi . Also note that SNi and S
V
Ni
are usually considered
practical consequence operators.
Depending upon the set C of consequence operators employed, there are usually
many X ⊂ L, X 6= L such that X is a C-system for each C ∈ C. For example, we
assumed in Herrmann (2001a, b) that there are two 1-ary relations for the science-
community logic-systems. One of these contains the logical axioms and the other
contains a set of physical axioms; a set of natural laws. Let {S′Ni | i ∈ IN} be
the set of science-community corresponding consequence operators relativized so as
to remove the set of logical theorems. Each member of a properly stated set of
natural laws, Nj, used to generate the consequence operators {S′Ni | i ∈ IN} should
be a C-system for each member of {S′Ni | i ∈ IN}. As mentioned, the physical
theories being considered here are not theories that produce new “natural laws.”
The argument that the Einstein-Hilbert equations characterize gravitation fields, in
general, leads to the acceptance by many science-communities of these equations as
a “natural law” that is then applied to actual physical objects. Newton’s Second
Law of motion is a statement about the notion of inertia within our universe. It can
now be derived from basic laboratory observation and has been shown to hold for
other physical models distinct from its standard usage (Herrmann, 1998). The logic-
systems that generate the members of {S′Ni | i ∈ IN} have as a 1-ary relation a set of
natural laws. Then one takes a set of specific physical hypotheses X that describes
the behavior of a natural-system and applies the logic-system to X. This gives a
statement as to how these natural laws affect, if at all, the behavior being described
by X. It is this approach that implies that each properly described Nj 6= L is a
C-system for each C ∈ {SNi | i ∈ IN}. Applying Theorem 4.1 to C = {S
′
Ni
| i ∈ IN},
where
⋃
{Ni | i ∈ IN} ⊂ K, leads to a result exactly like Corollary 4.1.1 where results
(i), (iii) and (iv), applied to members of {Ni | i ∈ IN}, are particularly significant.
This result is stated as the Abstract for this paper.
At any moment in human history, one can assume, due to the parameters
present, that there is, at the least, a denumerable set of science-community logic-
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systems or that there exist only a finite collection of practical logic-systems defined
on finite Lf . The corresponding set Cf = {Cfi | i = 1, . . . , n} ⊂ C
f
f of practical
consequence operators would tend to vary in cardinality at different moments in
human history. For the corresponding finite set of practical consequence operators,
by Theorem 2.10, there is a standard (least upper bound) practical consequence
operator U , and hence “the best” practical logic-system, that unifies such a finite
set. The following result is the interpretation of Theorem 4.1 for such a finite set
of practical consequence operators.
Theorem 5.1. Let Lf and Cf be defined as above. Suppose that Cf is system
consistent.
(i) Then there exists a practical consequence operator U1 ∈ Cff defined on
the set of all subsets of Lf such that U1 6= U, and a W ⊂ L such that, for each
Cfi ∈ C
f , Cfi (W) = U1(W) = W 6= L
f , where U1(W) ⊂ Lf .
(ii) For each X ⊂ Lf ,
⋃
{Cfi (X) | i = 1, · · · , n} ⊂ U1(X) ⊂ L
f and U1 is the
least upper bound in 〈Cff ,∨w,∧, I,U〉 for C
f .
(iii) Let X ⊂ Lf and X 6= Lf be a Cfi -system for each C
f
i ∈ C
f . Then
X = Cfi (X) = U1(X) 6= L
f , i = 1, · · · , n.
Letting finite Cf contain practical consequence operators either of the type SNi ,
SVNi or S
′
Ni
, exclusively, then U1 would have the appropriate additional properties
and would generate a practical logic-system. Corollary 2.10.1 and Theorem 3.8 yield
a more general unification
∨
wA, A ⊂ Cf , as represented by a least upper bound in
〈Cf ,∨w, I,U〉, with the same properties as stated in Theorem 5.1. Thus depending
upon how physical theories are presented and assuming system consistency, there
are nontrivial standard unifications for such physical theories. Assuming that |A| =
ℵ0, and that A is system consistent, then the Corollary 2.10.1 unification
∨
wA
corresponds to a (nontrivial) nonstandard ultralogic unification ∗
∨
w
A with all of
the same stated properties as those of the U . However, ∗
∨
w
A and U have one
significant difference. The ultralogic U is, with respect to internal subsets of ∗L,
a “least upper bound” of a hyperfinite collection, where as ∗
∨
w
A need not have
this additional hyperfinite property. Further, system consistency is used only so
that one statement in Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.2, Theorem 5.1 and this paragraph
will hold. This one fact is that each of the standard unifications of a collection
A ⊂ Cf is not the same as the upper unit if and only if the A is system consistent.
Further, if an X ⊂ Lf [resp. X ⊂ L] is U1-consistent [resp
∨
wA-consistent], then X
is C-consistent for each C ∈ Cf [resp. C ∈ A].
For General Intelligent Design Theory, the ultralogic U , U1 or ∗
∨
w
A can
replace the SW and Π discussed in Herrmann (2001a, b) and can, obviously, be
interpreted as an intelligence that designs and controls the combined behavior ex-
hibited by members of C = {S′Ni | i ∈ IN}, as they are simultaneously applied
to a natural-system. For denumerable C, it is also significant that the ultralogics
{ ∗g(i) | i ∈ [0, λ]−IN} [resp. D ∈ ∗C−C] represent ultranatural theories relative to
ultranatural laws contained in ∗{Ni | i ∈ IN} and these ultralogics are unified by U
[resp. ∗
∨
w
A]. These ultranatural laws would lead to various ultranatural events
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as being required constituents associated with event sequences. Further, from the
definition of refined theories as discussed in Herrmann (2001a, b), ∗{Ni | i ∈ IN}
contains descriptions for the ultrasubparticles. This is a second prediction that
these various “ultra” objects can be assumed to rationally exist, where they were
first discovered by other methods that appear in Herrmann (1993).
Remark 5.2. I mentioned that the nonstandard results obtained in section
4.1 are established by means of the most trivial methods used in Robinson-styled
nonstandard analysis.
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